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FROM DEBTOR'S SHIELD TO CREDITOR'S SWORD:
CRAM DOWN UNDER THE CHANDLER ACT
AND THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT
The first comprehensive revision of bankruptcy law in forty years
was completed on November 6, 1978, when President Carter signed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978.1 As it becomes effective on October 1,
1979, the new act introduces substantive changes that will undoubtedly
have a tremendous impact on bankruptcy law. 2 The new act rejuvenates the system, taking into consideration changes in commercial
transactions, lending conditions and public policy. 3 Among the adjustments are an expanded jurisdiction for the United States Bankruptcy Court, 4 the creation of an office of United States trustee to perform several administrative functions formerly the responsibility of the
bankruptcy court,5 and alterations necessitated by the adoption of the
Uniform Commercial Code. 6 One major change in the new act is the
consolidation of the provisions for reorganization in four chapters of
the old act 7 into one new chapter, to be known as chapter 11.8 The new
1. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 101-151, 326)
[hereinafter referred to in the text as the new act].
2. 124 CONG. REc. S17,404 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978). See Green, Goingfor Broke, Wall St.
J., Nov. 15, 1978, at 1, col. 8. The last major revision was the Chandler Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
696, 52 Stat. 840 (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676, 801-926 (1976)) [hereinafter referred to in the
text as the old act].
3. Klein, Bankruptcy Law Revamp... Analysis, Chi. Daily L. Bull., Nov. 8, 1978, at 1, col.
3 [hereinafter cited as Klein].
4. The jurisdiction of the new bankruptcy court is expanded to include in personam
jurisdiction as well as the power to decide all claims "arising under title II, or arising in or related
to cases under title 11." Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2663 (1978) (to be codified at 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1471-1482) (amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 1471-1482 (1976)). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 11-12, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5972-74.
5. The office of United States trustee has been created on a trial basis in ten federal districts,
including the Northern District of Illinois. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598,
§§ 224, 408, 92 Stat. 2662-67, 2686-87 (1978). See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess.
109-15, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5972-74, 6242-44.
6. Klein, supra note 3, at 1.
7. Chapter VIII covers railroad reorganizations; Bankruptcy Act § 77, 11 U.S.C. §§ 77, 205
(1976); chapter X provides for a complete reorganization of a corporation, Bankruptcy Act §§ 101276, 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976); chapter XI provides for arrangements and compositions of corporations, Bankruptcy Act §§ 301-399, 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-99 (1976); chapter XII provides for arrangements for noncorporate entities involved in real estate, Bankruptcy Act §§ 401-526, 11
U.S.C. §§ 801-926 (1976). The lines between the latter three chapters were unclear when drawn in
1938 and have blurred further over the past 40 years. The concept of business reorganization was
not as well developed in 1938 as it is today. As a consequence, the old act's chapters reflect a lack
of sophistication in handling the problems of modern corporate finance. H.R. REP. No. 95-595,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 221-23, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6180-83.
8. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2626-44 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174).
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chapter embodies many provisions of the old reorganization chapters
and embraces several original concepts as well.9 Combining the business reorganization chapters into one chapter simplifies reorganization
procedure, eliminating the most grievous threat to any business reorganization-needlessly wasted time and delay in litigation.' 0
The success of every reorganization hinges on the creditors' acceptance of the proposed plan of arrangement. l ' Creditors with valid,
allowed claims are divided into classes according to the nature of their
individual claims.12 The debtor or some or all of the creditors propose
a plan of arrangement setting forth the amount and the method of payment of each claim. 13 Creditors whose claims are materially and adversely altered by the plan constitute "affected creditors" 14 who may
vote whether to accept or reject the plan. Recipients of the full amount
of their claims are not affected by the plan and are not entitled to vote.
A plan is accepted when a two-thirds majority of each affected class
assents to it. '5 The court confirms the plan subject to the requirements
6
of the particular chapter.'
An alternative method of acceptance is available to debtors in
9. See 124 CONG. REC. HlI,100-11,103 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978). See also Klein, supra
note 3, at 1.
10. Corporations often suffer appreciable deterioration if they are caught in a reorganization
proceeding for any substantial length of time. The new act seeks to eliminate this delay by permitting a debtor to "affect" creditors and shareholders in the same proceeding. 124 CONG. REC.
HI 1,102 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
11. The plan contains the proposed reorganization of the business. Each reorganization
chapter describes which parties may propose a plan and what the plan must contain. Parties who
may propose a plan under the new act are defined in Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2631 (1978) (to
be codified at II U.S.C. § 1121).
12. The court arranges the classes of creditors and interest holders according to the type of
interest involved, either a secured or unsecured debt or an equity interest. Having determined the
nature of the claim, the court then arranges classes according to the size of the debt. See, e.g.,
Bankruptcy Act §§ 216, 452, 11 U.S.C. §§ 616, 852 (1976).
13. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2631-37 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29).
14. Affected creditors in chapter XII are those creditors whose contract rights are materially
and adversely altered by the debtor's plan. II U.S.C. § 807 (1976). Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d
232 (2d Cir. 1941). The new act has changed the term to "impairment" of claims or interests.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2633 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1124). A claim or interest is
impaired when the plan alters the legal, equitable or contractual rights on which the claim or
interest is based. Id.
15. Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1976); Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2635 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1126).
16. Chapter X plans must be "fair and equitable and feasible." II U.S.C. § 221(2) (1976).
See In re Northland Const. Co., 560 F.2d 756 (7th Cir. 1977). Chapters XI and XII require that
plans be in the best interests of creditors. II U.S.C. §§ 766(2), 872(2) (1976). See In re Colonial
Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154 (lst Cir. 1975). The new act contains separate standards for assenting and dissenting claimants. The best interests test codified as liquidation value or better, is
applied to assenting claimants, and the fair and equitable test is applied to dissenting ones. Pub.
L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2635-38 (1978) (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. § 1129(a), (b)).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

chapters X and XII of the old act. ' 7 This device, commonly known as
"cram down,"' 18 may be broadly described as permitting a plan to be
accepted despite a negative vote by a majority of each class, provided
the plan adequately protects the value of each dissenting creditor's
claim. 19 Because all reorganizations have been consolidated into one
chapter under the new act, the use of cram down will be expanded to
include all creditors and interest holders of the reorganized debtor. 20
Undoubtedly, the new act will promote increased usage of cram down.
Courts deciding whether to implement a forced acceptance of a
debtor's reorganization under the new act will need to rely upon existing precedent. 2 1 There has been a substantial amount of litigation
dealing with cram down under chapter XII.22 This has proved to be a
source of controversy concerning when cram down should be applied. 2 3
Problems of interpretation of cram down arise because the statu17. 11 U.S.C. §§ 616(7), 861(11) (1976).
18. "Cram down" is a term used by some bankruptcy lawyers and bankruptcy commentators to describe the application of [section 861(1 1)] under Chapter XII and [section
616(7)] under Chapter X of the Act upon a dissenting class of creditors where the proposed plan failed to receive approval of the requisite majority ....
[Ilt is a self-evident,
vivid term of immediate understanding, perhaps requiring no explanation. It creates an
instant correct connotation of the involuntary administration of bad medicine upon a
recalcitrant victim, the secured creditor who opposes the effects of the reorganization
proceedings in the Bankruptcy Court.
In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581, 591 n.16 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
19. This interpretation of cram down is a hotly disputed issue. See, e.g., Fine, Unjamming the
"Cram-Down," 52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 321, 335-39 (1978) [hereinafter referred to as Fine]; Nicholson, Chapter XII: R habilitation or Resurrection? The Cram-Down and Other Problems, 26 EMORY L.J. 489 (1977) [hereinafter referred to as Nicholson]. Even this general description of cram
down would not be acceptable to those courts adhering to the reasoning of In re Herweg, 119 F.2d
941 (7th Cir. 1941). See text accompanying notes 63-75 infra.
20. Chapter 11 of the new act will affect secured and unsecured creditors and all interest
holders. The cram down provision will affect these interests as well. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat.
2637-38 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
21. Moreover, the old act will continue as the applicable law for all cases commenced prior to
Oct. 1, 1979, and will continue as applicable law for those cases still pending until April 1, 1984.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, § 403(a), Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2683 (1978).
22. In re Gardens of Cortez, 585 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1978); In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 547
F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); Taylor v. Wood, 458 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972); Sumida v. Yumen, 409 F.2d
654 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied,405 U.S. 964 (1972); Rader v. Boyd, 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959);
In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941); In re Hamburger, 117 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1941); Kyser
v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Schwab-Adams Co., 463 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. I11.1977); In re KRO Assocs., 4 Bankr. Ct.
Dec. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Stillbar Const. Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1978); In re
Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Triangle Inn Assocs., 14 C.B.C.
532 (E.D. Va. 1977); In re Georgetown Apts., 10 C.B.C. 512 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re Bakare Realty
Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re Hobson Pike Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1205
(N.D. Ga. 1977).
See Gilbert & Massari, ChapterXII "Cram-Down' Bad Medicine or Just Desserts?, 52 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 99 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gilbert & Massari]; Merrick, ChapterXII-Why Is It?,
52 AM. BANKR. L.J. 213 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Merrick].
23. The chapter XII decisions dealing with cram down provide a better basis for discussion
than do the few chapter X cram down cases. See, e.g., Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. DuBois,
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tory language of the old act is ambiguous with respect to the precise
nature of the circumstances under which cram down is available. The
courts have attempted to fill this vacuum but have disagreed in their
interpretation of what Congress intended. Two divergent lines of reasoning have emerged: One view, 24 holds that cram down is available
only in limited circumstances; 25 the other view, 26 asserts that cram
down should not be so restrictively construed. The former view applies
a one-step analysis: 27 Unless two-thirds of each class of creditors assents to the plan in the first place, courts subscribing to this analysis
summarily deny use of cram down against the dissenting creditors.
Cram down is refused irrespective of whether there are several classes
of dissenting secured creditors or whether the plan involves only a sin28
gle mortgagee.
A two-step approach was developed in response to the inflexibility
of the traditional one-step approach. 29 The number of dissenting affected creditor classes is ascertained. The court then determines
whether the plan adequately protects the claims of the individual dissenting creditors in each class. If the court is satisfied as to the adequacy of protection, the dissenting classes are crammed down and the
30
plan is confirmed despite their objections.
The cram down provision in chapter 11 of the new act 3 ' is an at312 U.S. 510 (1941); In re Equity Funding Corp. of America, 396 F. Supp. 1266 (C.D. Cal. 1975).
Therefore, this note will limit consideration to the chapter XII cases.
24. This view was first articulated in In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941). For an in
depth analysis of Herweg, see Gilbert & Massari, supra note 22, at 113.
25. See, e.g., In re Gardens of Cortez, 585 F.2d 975 (10th Cir. 1978); Taylor v. Wood, 458
F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972); Rader v. Boyd, 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959); Kyser v. MacAdam, 117
F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1977); In re Stillbar
Const. Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1978); In re Georgetown Apts., 10 C.B.C. 512 ( M.D.
Fla. 1977); In re Bekare Realty Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
See also Lifton, Real Estatein Trouble: Lender's Remedies Need an Overhaul,31 Bus. LAW.
1927, 1961 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Lifton]; Gilbert & Massari, supra note 22; Nicholson, supra
note 19.
26. This view was first advanced by In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga.
1976).
27. See In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941, 943 (7th Cir. 1941).
28. See text accompanying notes 76-79 infra.
29. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581, 602-04 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
30. Id at 601-02.
31. The text of the cram down provision provides:
(1) . . .[I]f all of the applicable requirements of subsection (a) of this section other
than paragraph (8) are met with respect to a plan, the court, on request of the proponent
of the plan, sha confi the plan notwithstanding the requirements of such paragraph if
the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equitable, with respect to each
impaired under, and has not accepted, the plan.
interestsofthat
class (2)
of claims
this issubsection, the condition that a plan be fair and equitafor theorpurpose
ble with respect to a class includes the following requirements:
(A) With respect to a class of secured claims, the plan provides(i)(I) that the holders of such claims retain the lien securing such claims,
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tempt to resolve various controversies which have arisen concerning
the application of cram down under chapter XII of the old act. 32 The
courts have been given more precise guidelines as to standards of protection for dissenting classes of creditors. 33 However, it appears that
congressional efforts may have transformed a protective mechanism for
debtors into an offensive weapon for creditors.
This note will describe the line of cases that developed and pre-

served the one-step approach to cram down. The two-step approach
with its more flexible definition of situations in which cram down is
available will then be examined. The necessity for adoption and expansion of this approach will be explained. Projections for the future
role of cram down under the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 will be
made. Controversies pertaining to the conflict concerning the old provision which have been resolved by the new act and those that continue
under the new act will then be discussed. This note will conclude with
the proposition that Congress has adopted the wrong approach and has
transformed cram down into a creditor's tool as a result.
whether the property subject to such lien is retained by the debtor or transferred to another entity, to the extent of the allowed amount of such claims; and
(II) that each holder of a claim of such class receive on account of such
claim deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of such
claim, of a value, as of the effective date of the plan, of at least the value of such
holder's interest in the estate's interest in such property;
(ii) for the sale, subject to section 363(k) of this title, of any property that
is subject to the lien securing such claims, free and clear of such lien, with such
lien to attach to the proceeds of such sale, and the treatment of such lien on
proceeds under clause (i) or (iii) of this subparagraph; or
(iii) for the realization by such holders of the indubitable equivalent of
such claims.
(B) With respect to a class of unsecured claims(i) the plan provides that each holder of a claim of such class receive or
retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the allowed amount of such claim; or
(ii) the holder of any claim or interest that is junior to the claims of such
class will not receive or retain on account of such junior claim or interest any
property.
(C) With respect to a class of interests(i) the plan provides that each holder of an interest of such class receive
or retain on account of such claim property of a value, as of the effective date of
the plan, equal to the greatest of the allowed amount of any fixed liquidation
preference to which such holder is entitled, any fixed redemption price to which
such holder is entitled, and the value of such interest; or
(ii) the holder of any interest that is junior to the interests of such class
will not receive or retain under the plan on account of such junior interest any
property.
Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)).
Subsection (a)(8) details one of the several requirements which must be met in order to permit court confirmation of a debtor's plan. It specifies that, "With respect to each class ... such
class has accepted the plan; or. . . such class is not impaired under the plan." Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2636 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8)(A), (B)).
32. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 220-24, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6179-83.
33. See text of statute at note 31 supra.
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THE TRADITIONAL ONE-STEP APPROACH TO DETERMINING
THE AVAILABILITY OF CRAM DOWN

The essential purpose of a reorganization proceeding is to preserve
the debtor's business as an ongoing operation in the face of financial
setbacks which have rendered the debtor unable to meet completely all
its obligations to creditors. 34 The debtor wishes to avoid a liquidation
proceeding in which the business is dissolved and its assets sold in order to partially satisfy the debts of the business. 35 To accomplish this,
the debtor seeks to reassure creditors that its financial difficulties are
temporary, that the business will be restored to health, and most, if not
all, debts will be paid. 36 Creditors must be convinced that by accepting
less than the face value of a claim or deferring payments over an extended period they will receive a larger portion of the amount owed
than they would if the debtor were forced to dissolve the business and
settle accounts in a liquidation proceeding. Thus, reorganization is
principally a debtor's means 37 to avoid the permanency of straight
bankruptcy, restricted only by the financial arrangements which credi39
tors38 and the court will accept.
Cram down in chapter XII is contained in section 46 1(11).40 The
provision provides for confirmation, even though the plan has been rejected by a two-thirds majority of each affected class, if each member of
the dissenting classes will receive adequate protection by one of four
methods: (1) the transfer, sale or debtor's retention of the property subject to the debt, (2) a sale of the property free of debts as long as the
price is not less than fair upset price, 4 ' followed by payment of debts
34.

REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT ON THE BANKRUPTCY ACT AND ITS ADMINISTRATION IN THE

COURTS OF THE UNITED STATES. SEN. Doc. No. 65, 72d Cong., 1st Sess. 39 (1931), reprintedin
H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 241-44, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 6373-76.

35. See Note, The Secured Creditor'sRight to Full Liquidation Value in CorporateReorganization, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 510 (1975).
36. Dole, ChapterXII Cram-Down Provisions, 1977 COM. L.J. 197 [hereinafter referred to as
Dole].
37. See, e.g., In re Pine Gate Assocs., 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also Merrick,
supra note 22, at 251; Nicholson, supra note 19, at 511.
38. Each chapter defines the minimum level of compensation a debtor must offer creditors.
In Chapters XI and XII the test is the "best interests of the creditors," which is interpreted to mean
more than liquidation value. United Properties, Inc. v. Emporium Dept. Stores, Inc., 379 F.2d 55
(8th Cir. 1967). In Chapter X compensation must be "equitable and feasible and in the best
interests of the creditors." Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v.
Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
39. Each chapter has a confirmation standard by which the court determines whether to con-

firm a plan that has been proposed to creditors affected by the reorganization. The confirmation
standard varies according to the particular chapter. See text accompanying notes 178-205 infra.
40. Bankruptcy Act § 461(11), 11 U.S.C. § 861(11) (1976).
41. Fair upset price must be an amount exceeding liquidation value. Relying on appraised
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from the proceeds, (3) appraisal and payment in cash of the value of
the debts or (4) by any method consistent with the circumstances of the
42
case which fairly protects the creditors.
Two cases, decided within months of one another, 43 combined to
establish the procedure for the one-step approach to determine the
availability of cram down in chapter XII. Kyser v. MacAdam" involved a debtor whose family home was encumbered by a mortgage
and several materialmen's liens. These debts exceeded the value of the
home, the only property included in the reorganization. 45 The debtor
proposed a plan that was based on two assumptions. First, the secured
creditors could only be secured up to the face value of the security.
They would be reclassified as unsecured creditors to the extent that
their liens exceeded the value of the house.46 Second, since the amount
of their claims had been scaled down to the value of the security, they
were secured to the extent of their claims under the plan. The plan
would not offer them any less than the value of the house; thus, these
creditors were not affected by the plan and as unaffected creditors, they
47
could not vote on the plan as secured creditors.
The specific plan which emerged from this recondite reasoning
proposed reducing each secured creditor's lien to one-half its stated
amount. 4 8 The lienors would be reclassified as unsecured creditors for
the remaining half of the debt owed them. Two classes of creditors
would be formed. One class would consist of claimants secured to the
extent of the appraised value of the house; the other class would include the materialmen's lienors for their claims in excess of the home's
value and all other unsecured creditors.49 The debtor contended that
because the plan would not deprive the lien creditors of the value of
their now scaled-down claims, the lienors were not materially and ad-

valuations, the court determines whether the amount bid constitutes fair upset price. See generall,
In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977).
42. The fourth method is the most flexible and consequently, most difficult method for the
courts to interpret. See In re Triangle Inn Assocs., 14 C.B.C. 532 (E.D. Va. 1977).
43. Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941), was decided on January 13, and In re
Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941), was decided on May 1.
44. 117 F.2d 232 (2d Cir. 1941).
45. Id at 234.
46. Id at 238.
47. Id This assertion is based on the theory that if the secured claim is only $4000 and the
plan offers to pay the secured creditors $4000 then they are receiving the full value of their claims,
i.e., creditors receiving full value unaffected by the plan, and cannot vote to accept or reject the
plan. See Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1976).
48. 117 F.2d at 234.
49. Id
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versely affected. ° Creditors not affected by the plan are not entitled to
vote. 51 Therefore, an affirmative vote by the unsecured creditor class
52
would be sufficient to allow approval of the debtor's plan.
53 It
The Kyser court refused to accept the debtor's argument.
stated that the secured creditors' claims could not be reduced by a substantial amount 54 merely to redesignate these claimants as unsecured

creditors for the excess. The plan did not provide for the payment of
the full value of the secured creditors' claims; therefore, they were affected by the plan and consequently entitled to vote. An arrangement
could not be adopted through the votes of unsecured creditors alone.
Similarly, cram down could not be utilized when the only affirmative
55
votes for the plan were those of the unsecured creditors.
In In re Herweg,56 the debtor's plan proposed that the secured
creditor class,57 comprised of first and second mortgagees, accept cash
payment of the appraised value of the building which was security for
the debt. However, because the appraised value of the collateral was
less than the face value of the debt, 58 the creditors rejected the plan,
preferring to collect their claims upon foreclosure at a judicial sale.
Since neither creditor accepted the plan, the court denied the debtor's
request to invoke cram down to force acceptance of the plan over the
secured creditors' objections. The cram down provision, the court said,
did not authorize forcing secured creditors unanimously opposed to the
59
plan to accept a reduced amount of their claims.
The Kyser and Herweg courts both denied debtors' requests to ap50. Id at 238.
51. Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1976).
52. If the only class affected by the plan were the unsecured creditors, then assent by twothirds of this class would constitute acceptance of the plan and cram down would be unnecessary.
Id.
53. 117 F.2d at 237-38.
54. When full payment was made under the plan, the secured creditors would have received
only two-thirds of the face amount of their original claims. Id at 238.
55. The court said that if an arrangement is to be adopted through the vote of the unsecured
creditors alone, according to the debtor's theory, this "would prove too much." Id. The cram
down provision provides safeguards for the interests of secured creditors, a provision never operative if the debtor's proposed manipulation of the value of the lienors' claims were allowed. Id
56. 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941).
57. The case described only one class comprised of the two mortgagees. However, it has
recently been established that other unsecured classes of creditors may have been involved in the
case at the trial court level. Merrick, supra note 22, at 247-50.
58. The appraised value was between $50,000 and $60,000, while at the time suit was
brought, the first mortgage still had $63,000 outstanding, and the second mortgage, $10,000.
59. The specific language of the court was, "section 461(11) does not authorize the court to
force secured creditors unanimously opposed to the plan, to accept payment of a reduced amount
of their claims .... " 119 F.2d at 943. While some courts employ this wording, other courts state
that at least one class of secured creditors must assent to plan. Meyer v. Rowen, 195 F.2d 263, 266
(10th Cir. 1952). Both phrases have the same general meaning and are used interchangeably.
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ply cram down in order to salvage plans of arrangement despite secured creditors' rejections of them. The basis for the denial in Kyser
was the court's statutory interpretation--cram down was held to be unavailable when unsecured creditors were the only classes accepting the
debtor's plan. 60 In Kyser, the unsecured creditors would recover a
larger portion of their claims if the debtor did not go into liquidation,
while the secured creditors would recover more if they foreclosed upon
their mortgages and forced the debtor to liquidate all its assets. 61 The
court perceived that it would be unfair to the secured creditors, 62 and
contrary to the intent of the statute, to force them to accept a plan via
cram down merely because the unsecured creditor classes had accepted
the plan.
In contrast, Herweg focused on the problem from the perspective
of the negative votes of secured creditors, 63 rather than the insufficiency
of affirmative votes from unsecured creditors. The basis for this interpretation was the belief that the statute required that a two-thirds majority of at least one class of secured creditors assent to the plan before
a dissenting class could be subjected to cram down. 64 Herweg involved
two classes of secured creditors, each comprised of one member. According to this interpretation, at least one secured creditor must assent
in order to invoke cram down. Since neither did, the debtor's plan was
65
denied.
The specific plans proposed in Kyser and Herweg failed to provide
adequate protection for the value of each creditor's claim. Therefore,
cram down should have been denied on the inadequacy of the plans,
rather than for the reasons expressed in the cases. A cram down in
Kyser would have forced the creditors to accept drastically reduced
amounts in exchange for the right to foreclose immediately on their
liens, the collateral for which might continue to diminish in value. The
Herweg court may have denied cram down because it believed that the
appraised value of the property had been substantialy underestimated. 66 Had the appraised value seemed more realistic, the plan
60. 117 F.2d at 238.
61. Id
62. Id
63. See 119 F.2d at 943.
64. See Gilbert & Massari, supra note 22, at 114-15.
65. 119 F.2d at 943.
66. If the debtor's theory had been successful, the appraised value of the property would have
been crucial to the plan. See note 58 supra. Therefore, the court may have suspected the debtor
of undervaluing the property so it would have to pay less to the secured creditors. See, e.g., In re
Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154 (Ist Cit. 1975); In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C.
503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
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might have been held to offer the creditors adequate protection. But
the propsed plan certainly did not adequately protect the creditors and
67
did not support a cram down.
Rather than limiting their holdings to the facts, both Kyser and
Herweg articulated unnecessarily sweeping conclusions of law. 68
While the Kyser opinion may be excused as an expression of policy,
namely, that it would be unfair to bind secured creditors to a plan accepted only by unsecured creditors, the Herweg court committed the
more grievous error by articulating a broad, arbitrary statement that
cram down was unavailable when secured creditors unanimously opposed the plan. Because the Herweg rule had no foundation in the
statute,69 the fact that it has been subsequently adopted without further
70
examination exacerbates the seriousness of the error.
The Herweg court's confusion should have been evident from the
nature of the opinion. Although the holding quite clearly precluded
the use of cram down when all classes of secured creditors unanimously
opposed the plan, the dictum implied a contradictory result. The court
stated that "no arrangement shall be blocked because one group of
creditors opposes it, provided that they are adequately protected by the
arrangement."' 7' The court may not have perceived the divergent reasoning embodied in its holding and dictum. 72 The language of the dic-

tum closely resembles the language of the statute. 73 It emphasizes the
adequacy of protection for dissenting groups of creditors. The holding,
on the other hand, concentrates on the existence of at least two-thirds
of one class of secured creditors who assent to the plan before any consideration can be given to applying cram down. The two approaches
67. The particulars of the debtor's plan substantiate the fact that the creditors were inadequately protected. See notes 56-58 and 66 and accompanying text, supra.
68. See generally In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also
Dole, supra note 36.
69. See also In re KRO Assocs., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
70. See Taylor v. Wood, 458 F.2d 15 (9th Cir. 1972); Rader v. Boyd, 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir.
1959); In re Stillbar Const. Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 452 (N.D. Ga. 1978); In re Bekare Realty
Assocs., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D.
Ill.
1977).
71. 119 F.2d at 943.
72. This apparent contradiction could be reconciled on the theory that the court in Herweg
was combining the requirements for cram down with the elements necessary for confirmation of
the plan by the court. The confirmation provision required, inter alia, that the plan comply with
the "fair and equitable" test. This stipulated that senior creditors must be fully compensated
before payments to junior creditors are considered. The court may have approached both holding
and dictum on the supposition that since the senior secured creditor would not receive full compensation, the plan could never be confirmed by the court. See text accompanying notes 81-93
inf7ra.
73. See note 31 srupra, for text of cram down provision.
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are irreconcilable, but the Herweg court explicitly designated the latter
to be the rule in the case. 74 Subsequent courts adopted the Herweg rule
that cram down could not be used to save a plan unless two-thirds of
the
one class of secured creditors assented to it, however impractical
75
rule might be when applied to the facts of a particular case.
Meyer v. Rowen 76 established a corollary to the Herweg rule.
There, the debtor's property was subject to a debt owed a single mortgagee. The court held that it was "obviously not the purpose" of the
cram down provision to confirm a plan of arrangement when no secured creditor agreed to the plan. 77 Meyer relied on the holding in
Herweg to explicitly deny cram down when only one secured creditor
is affected by the plan and that creditor rejects it. The court concluded
that irrespective of the number of secured creditor classes or the
78
number of secured creditors in each class, the Herweg rule applied.
Unless two-thirds of any secured class assented, it was unnecessary
even to consider whether the debtor's plan adequately protected the
value of the dissenting creditor's claim.
The Meyer court's expansion of the Herweg approach to encompass sole secured creditor situations further restricted the availability of
cram down. 79 The ultimate result of Meyer v. Rowen was to give sole
secured creditors the final word on whether the reorganization will succeed, or whether the creditor will draw the debtor into a foreclosure
proceeding. 80 The court could have avoided setting this precedent. Instead, cram down could have been denied on the rationale that the plan
failed to adequately protect the value of the mortgagee's claim, rather
than on the ground that the sole secured creditor dissented to the plan.
THE

1952

AMENDMENT:

DELETION OF THE ABSOLUTE

PRIORITY RULE AND CONTINUED ADHERENCE TO HERWEG
DESPITE THE CHANGE

Herweg, Kyser and Meyer were all decided subject to the confir74. 119 F.2d at 943.
75. The Herweg rule is particularly impractical where only one secured creditor is affected by
the plan. Since the creditor's vote cannot be divided into thirds, that one interest holder must
assent. See generally In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581, 599-601 (N.D. Ga. 1976); In re
Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
76. 195 F.2d 263 (10th Cir. 1952).
77. Id at 266.
78. Id
79. Had the Herweg rule not been adopted for sole secured creditors, the courts might have
developed a more flexible approach, similar to that of In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581
(N.D. Ga. 1976).
80. 195 F.2d at 265.
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mation requirement that a plan be "fair and equitable, and feasible and
in the best interest of the creditors." 8' The absolute priority rule requires that a senior class of creditors must receive full compensation
before any subordinate class is entitled to payment. 82 A plan might be
confirmed by means of a cram down if it adequately protected the
value of the dissenting creditors' claims, but the court could not confirm the plan unless the distribution of value complied with the absolute priority rule. 83 The rule created additional barriers for the debtor
84
seeking rehabilitation.
85
As part of the 1952 omnibus amendments to the Bankruptcy Act,
Congress deleted the absolute priority rule as a prerequisite for confirmation of a chapter XII plan. 86 The requirement was eliminated from
the confirmation standard because the rule could not be applied in
chapter XII "without impairing, if not entirely making valueless, the
relief provided by this Chapter. '8 7 It was thought that after secured
creditors were accorded absolute priority to the extent of their claims,
the reorganized debtor would be left with insufficient property to reestablish itself. Congress viewed the deletion of the absolute priority
rule as increasing the prospects that a chapter XII debtor would emerge
from an arrangement proceeding with most of its property intact, al88
though it may be reconstituted in a different form.
The 1952 amendment should have effectively superseded the
Herweg interpretation of cram down. The deletion of the absolute priority rule made it possible for a debtor to propose a plan in which it
would retain possession of an interest in its property without making
full payment of debts owed senior secured creditors. 89 Even if the senior secured creditors rejected the plan, the court was free to consider
81.

Bankruptcy Act § 472, 11 U.S.C. § 872 (1976).

82. The absolute priority rule satisfies the relative priorities by the fair and equitable requirement. See Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939); Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. Boyd, 228 U.S. 482 (1913).
83. See Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510 (1941); Case v. Los Angeles
Lumber Prods. Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939). Cf In re Northland Const. Co., 560 F.2d 756 (7th Cir.
1977) (chapter X); see generally In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); In re
Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975); In re Hartsdale Assocs., 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
1275 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
84. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154, 157-59 (1st Cir. 1975). See also
Dole, supra note 36, at 201-03; Fine, supra note 19, at 330-36.
85. Pub. L. No. 456, 66 Stat. 435 (1952) (codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1-1086 (1976)).
86. The confirmation requirement subsequent to the amendment is that the plan must be in
the best interests of the creditors and feasible. Bankruptcy Act § 472, 11 U.S.C. § 872 (1976).
87. S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1960.
88. Lifton, supra note 25, at 1977.
89. See, e.g., In re Stillbar Const. Co., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 452, 454 (N.D. Ga. 1978).
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the possibility of cram down without the prior restraints imposed by
the absolute priority rule. 90
Nevertheless, the Herweg rule continued to be the predominant
interpretation of the cram down provision. This was true even though
the outcome in Herweg may have been influenced by the fact that the
court did not believe that the absolute priority rule had been complied
with and denied cram down on that basis. 9' While the amendment
may not have explicitly neutralized the Herweg rule because the court
did not explain the absolute priority rule's effect on the outcome of the
case, it is certain that post-1952 courts were not constrained by the absolute priority rule. 92 Therefore, later decisions should have discounted the Herweg interpretation to the extent that it was a
93
consequence of the absolute priority rule.
Although some courts raised the possibility of different analytical
schemes to determine the availability of cram down, 94 none directly
challenged the one-step approach to cram down. Rader v. Boyd,95 for
example, involved a sole secured creditor who rejected the proposed
plan of arrangement. 96 Instead of an automatic denial of cram down,
as Herweg would require, the Rader court asked whether the plan adequately protected the creditor's claim. Concluding that plan was "too
speculative, '97 the court rejected it without actually deciding whether
to apply the Herweg rule.
In the period prior to 1975, only one case acknowledged the anomalies inherent in Herweg. In Sumida v. Yumen, 9 8 the court admitted
that a plan of arrangement conceivably could be formulated to protect
adequately unanimously dissenting classes of secured creditors despite
the Herweg rule.99 The court acknowledged by implication that the
Herweg rule was incorrect or at least incomplete. Despite Sumida's
90. 119 F.2d at 943.
91. See notes 71-75 and accompanying text supra.
92. Merrick, supra note 22, at 246-47.
93. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581, 599-601 (N.D. Ga. 1976); see, e.g., In re
Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir, 1977); In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154
(1st Cir. 1975).
94. See, e.g., Sumida v. Yumen, 409 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964
(1972).
95. 267 F.2d 911 (10th Cir. 1959).
96. The plan would have allowed the debtor to retain possession of its oil wells. Creditor
Boyd would receive stock in a newly formed corporation which would own the property and
assume the debt. Id at 913.
97. Id
98. 409 F.2d 654 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 964 (1972).
99. The court interpreted the cram down provision to require investigation of the adequacy
of protection provided by the plan prior to any decision regarding the availability of cram down.
Id at 659.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

dalliance with a contrary rule, the court accepted the hegemony of the
Herweg approach, and held that it could not apply cram down in the
absence of the assent of one secured class to the plan.
THE TRADITIONAL ONE-STEP APPROACH OF HER WEG CHALLENGED:

IN RE PINE GATE

& ASSOCIATES, LTD.

The traditional one-step approach of Herweg severely restricted
the availability of cram down to situations where at least two-thirds of
one class of secured creditors assented to the plan. This approach prevented bankruptcy courts from considering the adequacy of the protection offered to dissenting creditors, limited judicial discretion, and
restricted cram down as an alternative standard in all but a few situations.
The harshness of the Herweg rule became apparent as the number
of chapter XII petitions increased during the mid-1970's. 1°° Tax reform laws had made it lucrative for limited partnerships to invest in
real estate.' 0 ' However, the subsequent real estate recession forced
many of these partnerships to seek the shelter of chapter XII in order to
avoid foreclosure and a recapture by the Internal Revenue Service of
deductions formerly made for depreciation of the value of the property. 10 2 Although the statutory intent of cram down was clearly to allow the debtor to retain its property despite creditor refusal to accept
the plan of arrangement, 0 3 the Herweg approach had so narrowly defined the debtor's right to cram down as to make it an almost nonexistent remedy. In their concern for dissenting creditors, the courts
transformed cram down, which was initially developed as a debtor's
remedy, into an additional means to protect creditors. This stark result
became more pronounced as the number of filings increased in which
the debtor's plan faced the dissent of a sole secured creditor, and
courts, following Herweg, permitted foreclosure without determining
the viability of the proposed plan.1o4
The most vigorous challenge to this traditional approach came in
In re Pine Gate Associates, Ltd ,105 the first case to closely review the
Herweg interpretation of cram down. Pine Gate involved a limited
100. The number of filings increased from a low of 1 in 1946 to 525 in 1976. Approximately
43% of all Chapter XII proceedings have been filed since 1974. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10
C.B.C. 581, 587 n.12 (N.D. Ga. 1976). See also Nicholson, supra note 19, at 490.
101. Lifton, supra note 25, at 1963 n.1 19.
102. Id. See I.R.C. § 1250.
103. In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581, 589-90 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
104. See, e.g., In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Inl. 1977).
105. 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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partnership debtor, whose business was ownership and operation of an
apartment complex, its sole asset. The debtor proposed a plan to refinance the existing debt owed on the project in order to pay almost all
the remaining principal owed the secured creditors.10 6 Of the six
classes of creditors, tax claimants comprised the first class. The plan
proposed payment to them in full; therefore, as unaffected creditors, the
tax claimants were not entitled to vote. Creditors in the other five remaining classes were affected by the plan. Four classes of unsecured
creditors approved it. Only the secured creditor class rejected the plan,
10 7
and urged adoption of the Herweg rule to prevent cram down.
The Pine Gate court refused to adopt the rule, concluding instead
that the dissenting creditors were subject to cram down, provided they
received the value of their security; further, the secured creditors were
not entitled to receive payment of their debts in full.' 0 8 The court held
that an appraisal of the collateral and payment in full of that amount
constituted adequate protection of the dissenting creditors' claims. 109
Pine Gate took issue with the Herweg requirement that one class of
secured creditors must assent to the plan in order to activate cram
down. The procedure prescribed by Herweg' "0 and its progeny for determining the availability of cram down involved only a one-step analysis, whereas Pine Gate asserted that compliance with the provision
required two steps. According to the Herweg approach, it was necessary only to ascertain which classes of secured creditors were affected
and non-accepting."I The Pine Gate court contended that the Herweg
approach was incomplete." 2 After discerning which classes of secured
creditors dissented, Pine Gate reasoned that as the next step, the court
must determine whether the plan adequately protected the dissenting
secured creditors. " 3 If the plan adequately protected the value of their
claims, the court may order cram down against the dissenting classes
and subsequently confirm the plan. Thus, the adequacy of protection,
not the number of dissenting secured creditors, was deemed pivotal to
the success of the plan.
The Pine Gate court conceded that the one-step approach may
have been viable when applied to the particular facts in Herweg, but it
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id at 584.
Id
Id at 600-01.
Id at 606.
119 F.2d at 943.

II1. Id

112. 10 C.B.C. at 599.
113. Id at 601.
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was too inflexible to be applied automatically in every instance of cram
down." 14 The facts prompting the Herweg rule differed dramatically
from the situation before the court in Pine Gate. The plan in Herweg
centered on the restructuring of the assets where the only security was a
house, the market value of which had diminished below the cost of
improvements that had been made on it. The mortgagees must have
been reluctant to postpone their rights to foreclose any longer, fearing
further diminution in the value of the property. The court apparently
respected the mortgagees' business acumen.
In Pine Gate, on the other hand, an ongoing business was involved, developed by its owners as a tax shelter 1 5 which would be lost
if the creditors were allowed to reject the plan and foreclose on their
mortgages. Although the debtor was unable to pay its debts the value
of its property was not likely to be reduced substantially. The Pine
Gate apartment complex, if fully occupied, was appraised at more than
the face value of secured debt. This factor, coupled with a healthy
business prognosis, meant that application of the Herweg rule would
force a reasonably viable operation, albeit in financial difficulty, into
liquidation. The Pine Gate court respected the statutory intent implicit
in the cram down provision 1 6 which seemed to have been overlooked
in Herweg. Cram down was intended as a method by which the debtor
could preserve its business and retain its property despite creditors' objections to the debtor's plan." 7 Both the cram down provision and
chapter XII generally provide that contract rights of secured creditors
may be modified or altered, even without their consent, as long as the
secured creditors receive payment or protection for their claims. Pine
Gate offered a new scheme for interpreting the availability of cram
down. The two-step approach permitted, in proper proportion, elements of debtor protection without jeopardizing creditor rights, as well
as a necessary measure of judicial discretion.
THE RECEPTION ACCORDED THE PINE GATE APPROACH

The two-step approach espoused by Pine Gate was wholeheartedly
adopted by some courts"18 while it was merely recognized and applied
114. Id at 603 n.29.
115. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 1250.
116. 10 C.B.C. at 599. The court also noted that congressional intent regarding the purposes
of cram down was explicit in the hearings dealing with the 1952 omnibus amendments. See S.
REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 1960.
117. S. REP. No. 1395, 82d Cong., 2d Sess., reprintedin [1952] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS
1960.
118. Eg., In re Schwab-Adams Co., 463 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re KRO Assocs., 4
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in addition to the Herweg rule by others." 9 In re Marietta Cobb Apartments Co.1 20 not only embraced the rule in Pine Gate but offered fur21
ther justification for it as well.'

The debtor in Marietta Cobb was a limited partnership owning an
apartment complex as its sole asset. The debtor proposed a plan 22 and
the only creditor, a mortgagee, rejected it and sought removal of a
stay 23 to foreclose on its mortgage. The debtor requested that the plan
be crammed down. Relying on Herweg, the creditor objected on the
ground that since it was the sole secured creditor and it dissented to the
proposed plan, cram down was impossible. The court in Marietta
Cobb rejected this line of reasoning, preferring the Pine Gate approach
24
instead. 1
Marietta Cobb was the first case to apply the two-step analysis of
cram down in a situation involving a sole dissenting secured creditor.
The court reasoned that if the cram down provision is interpreted in
conjunction with the confirmation provision, 25 together they reflect
legislative intent not to foreclose the debtor from an opportunity for
26
successful rehabilitation at the will of a single, recalcitrant creditor.
Confirmation of a plan may be obtained after the plan has been accepted by two-thirds of each class, exclusive of those creditors not affected by the plan or for whom payment or protection has been
provided under the cram down provision. 127 Moreover, the court interpreted the cram down provision as a method by which acceptance may
be obtained when the number of assenting creditors in a given class
Bankr. Ct. Dec. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y.
1977).
119. In re Georgetown Apts., 10 C.B.C. 512 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F.
Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1977); In re Alpine & Lake Tahoe Paradise, Ltd., 7 C.B.C. 286 (S.D. Cal.
1975).
120. 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
121. For a discussion of the impact Marietta Cobb has made on the use of cram down under
chapter XII see Fine, supra note 19, at 335.
122. The precise nature of the debtor's plan is not discussed. 14 C.B.C. at 503.
123. Fed. R. Bankr. P. 12-60(a)(5).
124. 14 C.B.C. at 508.
125. Bankruptcy Act § 468, 11 U.S.C. § 868 (1976), provides:
If an arrangement has not been so accepted, an application for the confirmation of an
arrangement may be filed with the court within such time as the court shall have fixed in
the notice of such meeting, or at or after such meeting and after, but not before(1) it has been accepted in writing by the creditors of each class, holding twothirds in amount of the debts of such class affected by the arrangement proved and allowed before the conclusion of the meeting, or before such other time as may be fixed by
the court, exclusive of creditors or of any class of them who are not affected by the
arrangement or for whom ayment or protection has been provided as prescribed in ...
[the cram down provisonfof this act. ...
126. 14 C.B.C. at 508.
127. Id. at 508-09.

CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW

falls short of the requisite two-thirds necessary under the traditional
method of acceptance. By combining this interpretation with congressional pronouncements that cram down should be treated as a mechanism protecting the reorganized debtor, the Marietta Cobb court
concluded that the Herweg condition precedent' 2 8 was without statutory basis. 129 Having concluded that a sole secured creditor was susceptible to cram down, the court then considered the adequacy of
protection afforded the creditor under the plan. However, sufficient information concerning the earnings of the property was unavailable,
preventing the court from making a finding as to the value of the property as a going concern. Until the property was given an appraised
value, the court could not determine whether the value of the property
was sufficient to protect adequately the value of the mortgagee's note.
Consequently, the court continued the case for later consideration of
30
that issue.
In re KRO Associates'3' similarly involved only one secured creditor affected by the debtor's plan. The debtor's sole asset was an office
building in Newark, New Jersey, in which the city was the only tenant.
The plan under consideration proposed cash payment to the mortgagee
plus a percentage of the earnings on the property for twelve years. The
creditor rejected the plan and sought to foreclose on the mortgage.
Since KRO was decided by the same judge who presided in Marietta
Cobb, 13 2 the court, not unexpectedly, subscribed to the two-step approach of Pine Gate as it was applied in the sole secured creditor situation of Marietta Cobb.
KRO suggested what would seem to be the logical final extension
of the Pine Gate approach to determine the availability of cram
down. 133 The crucial issue, according to Pine Gate, is whether the plan
provides adequate payment and protection for the dissenting creditor's
claim. 134 Therefore, the decision as to whether to apply cram down
depends upon the amount of cash payment or the estimated earning

128. The condition in Herweg is that two-thirds of one class of secured creditors must assent to
the plan prior to consideration of cram down. 119 F.2d at 943.
129.

14 C.B.C. at 509-10.

130. Id. at 515-21. The subsequent proceedings were not reported. See Fine, supra note 19, at
325.
131.

4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).

132. The Honorable Roy Babbit, Bankruptcy Judge for the Southern District of New York,
decided both cases.
133. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 463-72.
134.

10 C.B.C. 581, 587 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
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capacity and future likelihood of success of the business. 35 The court
must make these factual determinations on an individual basis, subject
to the guidelines imposed by the statute. 36 These findings should not
be governed by the unnecessarily broad mechanistic approach first advocated in Herweg. Neither the number of dissenting creditors nor the
nature of their claim has any relevance under the Pine Gate analysis.
As long as the overriding purpose of cram down is to guard debtors'
plans for rehabilitation from frustration by obstinate creditors, then,
according to the KRO court, it should make little difference whether
the sole affected creditor or all classes of creditors dissent to the proposed plan. 37 Following this rationale, it is possible to confirm a plan
even when all classes of affected creditors dissent, providing that ade138
quate payment and protection is given to each dissenter.
A few courts adopted the reasoning of both Herweg and Pine Gate
when they decided the accessibility of cram down. 139 The result was a
hybrid approach that was possible only because the courts advocating
this analysis failed to comprehend that Herweg and Pine Gate emphasized totally different factors. The criteria used in In re Alpine & Lake
Tahoe Paradise,Ltd, 4° included the number of dissenting secured
creditors as well as the adequacy of protection afforded the dissenters.
The plan in Tahoe contemplated the sale of large parcels of its
land development project in order to seek refinancing to pay off the
mortgage. All twenty-six unsecured creditors assented to the plan. The
secured creditor objected because the indiscriminate sale would violate
a trust deed agreement between it and Tahoe which required that the
property be sold sequentially. The creditor asserted that a non-sequential sale would diminish the value of the property. 14' The court dismissed the petition on two theories: The sale would jeopardize the

135. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 465. See also H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 244-46,
reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 6375-77.
136. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 466. The court must determine whether the creditor is adequately
protected according to one of the four methods described in the cram down provision. For the
text of the statute, see note 31 supra.
137. 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 466.
138. The KRO court suggests that this proposal was made in the recent case of In re SchwabAdams Co., 463 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. at 466.
139. In re Georgetown Apts., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 512 (M.D. Fla. 1977); In re Spicewood Assocs., 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. II1. 1977); In re Alpine & Lake Tahoe Paradise, Ltd., 7 C.B.C. 286
(S.D. Cal. 1975).
140. 7 C.B.C. 286 (S.D. Cal. 1975). Tahoe was decided before the Pine Gate decision cited in
this note. Two earlier interim opinions had been published by the time the Tahoe court reached
its decision.
141. 7 C.B.C. at 289.
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creditor's security interest, 4 2 and the plan had not been accepted by
the sole secured creditor. 14 3 The Tahoe court determined that the plan
of arrangement offered inadequate protection to the dissenting secured
creditor. 44 Thus, the court could have denied a cram down simply by
adopting the Pine Gate reasoning. Nevertheless, the Tahoe court stated
that it was denying cram down because the sole secured creditor re145
jected the plan.
In re SpicewoodAssociates'46 followed its own hybrid approach.
The debtor in Spicewood owned a single asset, an apartment complex
encumbered by two mortgages; in addition there were several unsecured debts. According to the debtor's proposed plan, the senior
mortgagee would receive two-thirds of the value of its claim and the
junior mortgagee would receive one-twentieth of its claim after the
property was sold.' 4 7 Both secured creditors dissented on the grounds
48
that the plan actually constituted a proposal for liquidation.
In response to the debtor's request for cram down, the court applied the Herweg rule and held that since both secured creditors rejected the plan, it was compelled to deny the debtor's request. 49 The
court noted the Pine Gate standard of adequate protection for dissenting creditors, but found that even if these secured creditors were protected, their unanimous objections would block confirmation. 50 The
Spicewood court may have included the reference to Pine Gate merely
to establish its awareness of the alternative approach and to show that
even if the two-step analysis were applied, the ultimate result would be
the same as under the Herweg approach.
The hybrid approach was again utilized in In re GeorgetownApartments.' 5' The decision in Georgetown first advocated a denial of cram
down based on the Pine Gate line of reasoning. 5 2 The court rejected
the plan because it did not adequately protect the creditor's security
interest. However, the Georgetown court remarked that even if the plan
142. Id. at 294-95.
143. Id.at 294.
144.
145.

Id.
Id.

146. 445 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Ill. 1977).
147. The plan proposed a sale to a private bidder or at public auction. Id. at 567.
148. The creditors reasoned that if the plan actually constituted a liquidation of the debtor's
assets, then the debtor belonged in a straight bankruptcy proceeding rather than a Chapter XII
reorganization. Id. at 566.
149. Id.
150. Id.
151.
152.

3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 512 (M.D. Fla. 1977).
Id. at 518.
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adequately protected the secured creditor, the rationale in Herweg
53
would have prevented cram down.
Tahoe, Spicewood and Georgetown evidence a stubborn refusal to
dispense with the requirement that at least one class of secured credi54
tors accept the plan before the others can be subject to cram down.
Each adopted the Pine Gate approach to the extent that it determined
the adequacy of protection for dissenting classes of secured creditors,
but none was willing to let the plan succeed or fail on adequate protection grounds alone. Instead, the Herweg requirement was superimposed upon the Pine Gate analysis. The hybrid analytical approach
does violence to the legislative purpose that cram down serve as a reasonably obtainable means by which a debtor can achieve rehabilitation.
THE

Two-STEP

ANALYSIS OF PINE GATE AS THE BETTER APPROACH

The Herweg prohibition against cram down unless two-thirds of
one class of secured creditors first assents to the plan resulted from a
restrictive approach to the statutory scheme of the cram down provisions. Although the facts in Herweg justified a denial of cram down,155
the situation did not warrant the broadly sweeping and unnecessarily
rigid pronouncement which followed. 15 6 In writing the reorganization
provisions, Congress created cram down as a specific mechanism to
protect debtors with otherwise viable plans from the machinations of
57
unreasonable creditors.
In challenging the Herweg analysis, the Pine Gate court reformulated the standard for the availability of cram down in light of several
factors which received only scant notice from the Herweg court. These
included the language of the cram down provision, legislative intent,
and the feasibility of cram down under modem business conditions.
According to the reasoning of Pine Gate,158 Herweg failed to consider
the statute in its entirety and further failed to take a comprehensive
approach to cram down in light of other provisions pertaining to the
plan of arrangement. The two-step approach adopted in Pine Gate
properly discards the unsubstantiated requirement that a two-thirds
153. Id.
154. See also In re Bekare Realty Assocs., 12 C.B.C. 646 (E.D. Pa. 1977); In re County Green
Ltd., 3 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 427 (W.D. Va. 1977).
155. The debtor's plan could not conceivably provide adequate protection for the value of the
creditor's claims. 119 F.2d at 943.
156. See text accompanying notes 59 and 68-70 supra.
157. See In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
158. See text accompanying notes 108-11 supra.
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majority of one class assent to the plan and replaces it with the substantive requirement that dissenting classes receive adequate protection
prior to being crammed down.
Clearly, Pine Gate is more reflective of the legislative spirit in
which cram down was included in chapter XII.159 By following this
method, a debtor's plan of arrangement can be more flexibly formulated. The provision was not intended to preclude a debtor's use of the
protective reaches of chapter XII simply because of the arbitrary composition of its classes of secured creditors. An extension of the flexible
approach in Pine Gate points to the conclusion that an entire class of
dissenting creditors may be subject to cram down, conditioned, of
course, upon the fact they receive adequate protection for the value of
their debt.' 60 The logical result of this approach is that cram down
might even be applied where there is unanimous rejection by all secured creditors.
CRAM DOWN UNDER CHAPTER

11

OF THE BANKRUPTCY REFORM ACT

By consolidating all four business reorganization sections of the
old act into one, chapter 11 seeks to eliminate antiquated distinctions
no longer relevant to current business practice.' 6 1 The flexibility presently restricted to chapter XI debtors becomes available to all reorganized debtors. 162 Selective public investor protection features available
only in chapter X is expanded to cover all equity holders. 63 Finally,
several substantive changes increases the versatility of the financial
standard for confirmation of a chapter 11 plan.' 64
The cram down provision is a key element in the fundamental
framework giving debtors and creditors more freedom to define a plan,
although within carefully defined limits. The procedures for creating
159. See, e.g., In re Marietta Cobb Apts. Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); In re Hobson
Pike Assocs., Ltd., 15 C.B.C. 346 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
160. See, e.g., In re Schwab-Adams Co., 463 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
161. 124 CONG. REC. HII,101 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
162. Chapter XI was originally intended to deal with debt owed to trade creditors, the principal creditors of small corporations. Large corporations with sizable public debt were to be handled under chapter X. However, the post-war creation of middle sized corporations with some
public debt blurred the distinctions between the two chapters. The distinction is no longer strictly
followed and most debtors seek the quicker, more informal procedure provided in chapter XI. See
generally H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 224-28, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 6295-358.

163. Id.
164. The confirmation requirements of a chapter II plan are found at Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92
Stat. 2636-37 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129). See text and accompanying notes 171217 infra.
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and bringing a plan to a vote are similar to those of the old act.' 65 In a
chapter 11 proceeding, the plan is filed with the court 166 and the classes
of secured and unsecured creditors and interest holders vote to accept
or reject the plan. Acceptance requires the assent of those holding at
least two-thirds in amount and comprising more than one-half in
number of the allowed claims of each class which votes.' 67 The vote is
taken at the confirmation hearing.' 68 Some votes however, are automatically tallied. Creditors receiving complete payment of the face
value of their claims are considered to have accepted the plan without
voting. 169 On the other hand, creditors receiving nothing are deemed
70
to have rejected the plan.'
Should a plan be rejected by a two-thirds vote of a class of claimants, the statute authorizes the court to confirm the plan despite the
negative vote' 7 ' as long as the following requirements are met: The
plan must comply with all applicable sections of the confirmation provision. It cannot discriminate unfairly towards any particular class.
Finally, the plan must be "fair and equitable"' 72 with respect to each
class of claimants that is impaired but has not accepted the plan. 173
The fair and equitable requirement affects the determination of a
plan's successful confirmation under cram down in two ways. On one
hand, it describes the minimum amount each class is entitled to receive
from the debtor in order to be considered by the court as having accepted the plan. On the other hand, fair and equitable treatment relates to the absolute priority rule.' 74 A senior creditor is entitled to no
more than one hundred percent of its claims before juni6r classes receive payment, but senior creditors must receive the full value of their
claims before any subordinate creditor or interest holder is entitled to
any payment. The new statute contains guidelines by which to deter165. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2631-38 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1121-29).
While the general effect of the procedures under the old and new bankruptcy acts is similar,
several important changes have been made. For a comparison and discussion of these changes,
see 124 CONG. REC. HII,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
166. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2631 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1121).
167. Id., 92 Stat. 2634-35 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1126).
168. Id., 92 Stat. 2636-37 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129).
169. Id., 92 Stat. 2633 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1124).
170. Id., 92 Stat. 2634-35 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1126).
171. This is the cram down section of the confirmation provision. Id., 92 Stat. at 2635-38
(1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)). For the complete text, see note 31 supra. Pub. L.
No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(1)).
172. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978)(to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § I 129(b)(1)).
173. Claimants include creditors and interest holders. Interest holders are all those with equity interests in the business entity including shareholders, debenture holders and bondholders.
174. See text accompanying notes 81-93, and note 72 supra.
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mine whether the plan is fair and equitable as it affects each dissenting
class of impaired creditors or interest holders. These guidelines are not
intended to impose rigid financial rules upon the plan,17 5 but in keeping with the flexible approach underlying the new act, they are merely
intended to define the minimum requirements of what must be included in the plan. 76 The requirements are separated according to
each of the three types of classes affected by the reorganization pro177
ceeding, secured and unsecured creditors, and interest holders.
Secured Creditors
In order to comply with the fair and equitable requirement for a
class of dissenting secured creditors, the plan must meet one of three
specifications.17 8 In the first alternative each individual holder of a
claim belonging to a dissenting class must retain its lien and receive
deferred cash payments totaling at least the allowed amount of the individual claim as long as it is equal to the value "of such holder's interest" in the estate's interest in the property. 79 The holder retains a
general lien,' 80 irrespective of whether the property that is the subject
of the lien is retained by the debtor or transferred to some other entity. 81 The second alternative provides for occasions when the prop82
erty that is the subject of the lien is sold free and clear of the lien.'
The lien then attaches to the proceeds of the sale and the creditor either
receives deferred payments as prescribed in the first alternative 8 3 or
receives payment of the "indubitable equivalence" of the claim as provided in the third alternative. 8 4 Providing the "indubitable equivalence" of the secured claims is the most speculative of the three
formulas, 8 5 and the one most likely to provoke litigation.
The indubitable equivalence is intended to cover payment or protection of claims made in a manner other than the methods specified in
the first two alternatives. 86 The indubitable equivalence standard was
175. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 242-55, reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6201-13.
176. 124 CONG. REC. H 1,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
177. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)).
178. Id. at 11 U.S.C. § 129(b)(2)(A)).
179. Id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i)(I) and (II).
180. These are liens on all the debtor's property.
181. 124 CONG. REC. H11,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
182. Id.
183. The first alternative requires the creditor to receive payments totaling the allowed
amount of the claim. See text accompanying note 179 supra.
184. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2)(A)(iii)).
185. 124 CONG. REC. H 1,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
186. Id.
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posited by Judge Learned Hand in In re Murel Holding Corp.187 Judge
Hand asserted that when a plan is required to treat the dissenting se-

cured creditor "equitably and fairly," the plan must provide the creditor with complete compensation. 88 Although the exact method of
compensation may vary, the total value must correspond to the "indubitable equivalence" of the original claim.
The codification of this term into the cram down provision reflects
congressional intent to rectify the difficulties courts faced under the old
act in determining what constituted adequate payment or protection for
the value of dissenters' claims. 8 9 The traditional view was focused
upon whether the value of the security was more or less than the value
of the debt. If the security exceeded the value of the debt, the dissenting creditor was entitled to the face value of the debt in order to receive
adequate protection.19 0 If, on the other hand, the value of the debt was
greater than the value of the security, 19 1 the debtor was entitled to the
value of the security. 92 The Pine Gate court went so far as to allow
cram down when the plan called for the appraisal of the property and
the payment of that value in cash. 193 The introduction of the indubitable equivalence is intended to resolve this problem.
In addition to resolving the valuation dilemma, the indubitable
equivalence standard reflects congressional intent to take a stricter approach toward methods of compensation for dissenting secured creditors. 194 Rather than allow appraisal and payment of the value in cash,
under the indubitable equivalence standard the creditor must receive
187. 75 F.2d 941 (2d Cir. 1935). The debtor corporations in Murel Holding owned an apartment complex with the assessed value of $540,000, encumbered by a $400,500 first mortgage on
which defaults amounted to almost $100,000. The debtor's plan of reorganization called for a
second mortgage providing $11,000, so that a tier of apartments could be renovated, improving
their rentability. The first mortgagee would forego all amortization payments for 10 years but
would receive the interest due on the mortgage. The court held that the plan was insufficient to
justify staying the foreclosure action in state court. The court reached this conclusion because the
creditor would not receive a mortgagee's payments for 10 years and the interest did not constitute
complete compensation for the property or the value of the security. Although the creditor, by
statute, was not entitled to receive either one, a substitute had to be of the most "indubitable
equivalence." Id. at 942.
188. Id.
189. For an analysis of this controversy in the context of chapter XII see Nicholson, supra
note 19, at 496-511. See also In re B & B Properties, Ltd., 423 F. Supp. 23 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
190. See, e.g., In re Pembroke Manor Apts., 547 F.2d 805 (4th Cir. 1977); In re Colonial
Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975).
191. See, e.g., In re Fairway Properties, 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 345 (M.D.N.C. 1978); In re KRO
Assocs., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 432 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
192. This is determined by an appraisal of the value of the property. The appraisal is often the
source of much controversy. See, e.g., In re Colonial Realty Inv. Co., 516 F.2d 154 (1st Cir. 1975).
193. See text accompanying note 109 supra.
194. 124 CONG. REC. HII,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
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complete compensation for the debt.' 95 Although the compensation
may be in an alternative form, it nevertheless must be equal in value.
Payment of the present appraised value may not be held to constitute
the indubitable equivalence because the creditors would be deprived of
the right to any future increase in value that might accrue on the collateral. 96 Therefore, it is logical to assume that compliance with the indubitable equivalence standard could mean in some cases that the
97
debtor must abandon the collateral in favor of the secured creditor.'
Unsecured Creditors
The new cram down provision also prescribes the manner of compensation for dissenting classes of unsecured creditors. They will re98
ceive fair and equitable treatment according to one of two formulas.
The plan must provide individual dissenters with property having a
present value equal to the allowed amount of the creditor's claim. The
definition of property is intended to be broadly construed. 99 It can be
anything having value, including of course, cash. 2 0 Anything reasonably equivalent to the value of the claim is acceptable to meet the requirements of the provision. This formula illustrates a determination
to allow the debtor more flexibility in arranging the pay out of unsecured creditors than secured creditors dissenting to the plan. While
the indubitable equivalence standard implies a stricter yardstick than
the one applied to secured creditors under the old act, the formula for
unsecured claims implies a more versatile approach.
The alternative treatment of unsecured creditors applies to situations in which the dissenting class will not receive any payment at
all. 20 ' These occur when the debtor's property is insufficent to go beyond payment to a more senior class of creditors. In such cases, the
absolute priority rule would prevent a junior class of creditors from
receiving any amount so long as the senior claimants remained unsatisfied. 20 2 The dissenting unsecured junior classes will be liable to cram
195. See note 187 and accompanying text, supra.
196. 124 CONG. REC. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
197. Id. The abandonment of the collateral of course presumes the debtor lacks sufficient cash
to pay off the creditors. It is hoped that this standard will not be used in a case where the collateral is an essential asset of the debtor. An obvious example is a debt secured by the inventory of
the debtor.
198. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2)(B)).
199. 124 CONG. REC. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
200. Id.
201. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2)(B)(ii)).
202. One distinguished commentator disagrees with this view. He contends that junior classes
will be encouraged to accept the plan rather than run the risk of a valuation hearing which could
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down so long as senior classes have not received more than full payment of their claims. Classes on a par with the dissenting class must be
203
treated the same as the dissenting class.
Interest Holders
The definition of "fair and equitable" respecting classes of impaired interest holders who dissent to the plan depends upon whether
the interest holders are entitled, under a corporation's articles of incorporation and bylaws, to a fixed liquidation preference or a fixed redemption price. If either condition applies, they must receive property
equal in value to the greater of the two in order to be subject to cram
down. 2°4 But if the plan precludes them from receiving any value, the
class can still be forced into a cram down so long as creditors or other
classes of interest holders senior to it do not receive more than the full
20 5
amount of their claims.
Additional Modiflcations
After it has been determined that the plan will treat all creditors in
a fair and equitable manner with respect to each dissenting class of
claims or interests it must then be determined that, as between each
class, the fair and equitable rule is observed. This aspect of fair and
equitable requires that an absolute priority rule be applied to give senior classes of creditors preferential treatment-ie., they receive full
2°6
payment of their claims before any junior class receives payment.
The absolute priority rule also affects the indubitable equivalence standard in that not only must senior creditors receive complete compensation, but they must receive payment before any creditors junior to them
can receive any compensation. 207 However, under the new act, no senior class can receive more than one hundred percent of the amount of
its claims.20 8 This is the result of the prohibition against "unfair discrimination," and constitutes a modification of the absolute priority
rule. 20 9 This modification should effectively prevent overreaching on
result in a determination that they would not be entitled to participate at all. King, Chapter 11 of
the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 107, 130 (1978) [hereinafter cited as King].
203. 124 CONG. REC. S17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
204. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (b)(2)(C)).
205. 124 CONG. REC. S 17,421 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978).
206. Id. For a discussion of the absolute priority rule see text accompanying notes 82-93
.supra.

207. See notes 187-88 and accompanying text, supra.
208. 124 CONG. REC. H 11,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).
209. Id.
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the part of senior classes.
Another modification of the absolute priority rule is the provision
which allows a class of secured creditors to elect to have its claims
treated as fully secured rather than as secured to the extent of the value
2 10
of the collateral and unsecured as to the deficiency that remains.
The election option has ramifications affecting both debtors and creditors in a cram down situation. From the debtor's perspective, the creditor's election to receive payments equal to the face amount of the debt
and of a present value equal to the security frees the debtor from concern about whether the proposed payment or protection satisfies the
indubitable equivalence standard. Once the creditor chooses to receive
the present cash value of the claim, then the creditor is excused from
consideration under the plan. The effect of the election is essentially to
remove the creditor from consideration under the cram down requirements.
The effect of the election provision from the creditor's perspective
is that upon confirmation of the plan it provides the creditor with payment, most often in the form of a note, of the present value of the security.21 1 The advantage is that the creditor takes a secured note that is
worth the present value of the security. If the creditor retains the note
over its full term, he will receive the full value of the debt. However,
the individual creditor cannot choose to elect the cash payment option
2 12
unless the entire class of dissenting creditors do so as well.
Further requirements necessary for cram down include all applica21 3
ble provisions detailed under the traditional confirmation provision.
21 4
This includes the requirement that at least one class of claimants
accept the plan in order to instigate cram down against the other classes
of claimants. Hence, the new provision answers in the affirmative one
aspect of the Herweg-Pine Gate dispute as to whether the statute requires the acceptance of one class prior to activating cram down. 2 15 In
210. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1111 (b)(2)). This
section provides in pertinent part:
If such an election is made, then notwithstanding section 506(a) of this title, such
claim is a secured claim to the extent that such claim is allowed.
See also CONG. REC. HI 1,104 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978).

211. Id. The creditor receives a note for the face value of the debt with an interest feature
payable over a given period. The note is negotiable.
212. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1I29(b)(2)(A)).
213.

Id. § 1129(b)(1).

214. Id. § 1129(A)(10). The class can be comprised of secured or unsecured creditors, but not
interest holders.
215. However, the new act leaves unresolved that aspect of the controversy that deals with the
difficulties this requirement creates in a situation where the sole creditor dissents to the plan. See
text accompanying notes 236-38 infra.
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order to forestall one form of abuse, the provision specifically discounts
acceptance by any class comprised of insiders of the debtor as constitut21 6
ing the requisite accepting class.
The availability of cram down has been expanded to debtors
whose reorganization affects security interests, trade creditors, and equity holders. The new act promotes a factually based approach to
cram down. In this regard, the framers seem to have embraced the Pine
Gate approach. Aside from the requirement that one class of claimants
accept the plan, the new act prescribes few substantive rules. Instead,
the particulars of a given plan are to be weighed according to minimum
standards and the success or failure of the plan is to be determined on
an individual basis. Once the plan has been proposed, the court must
ascertain which classes of creditors are "impaired" by the plan. Those
classes which are "impaired" and accept the plan must receive liquidation value or better in order to meet the confirmation standard. 21 7 Secured creditors dissenting from the plan are entitled to the indubitable
equivalence of the value of their claims, and the plan must be fair and
equitable with respect to each dissenting class of claims or interests.
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE NEW CRAM DOWN PROVISION

The cram down provision Congress originally adopted was
designed as a means to protect debtors. Under the old act cram down
allows the court to coerce dissenting creditors to adhere to a plan.
Once the plan has been voted upon and the dissenting votes registered,
the provision is invoked to prevent frustration of the rehabilitative
process. 21 8 Concomitantly, dissenting classes are not penalized for
their dissenting votes by being given less than the amount of the value
awarded assenting classes. Instead, the same confirmation standard applies to assenting and dissenting creditors under the old cram down
2 19
provision.
In expanding its importance under chapter 11 of the new act, Congress has given cram down 220 a different thrust than that of the old act.
Instead of a flexible mechanism by which debtors can restructure their
216. Presumably the framers of the new act sought to avoid a situation like that which occurred in In re KRO Assocs., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). There, several unsecured
creditors were partners of the debtor. In fact, they were corporations whose directors were the
same individuals as the limited partnership debtor. The unsecured creditors were the only creditors accepting the plan. Id. at 464.
217. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2635-37 (1978) (to be codified at I I U.S.C. § 1129(a) (1978)).
218. See text accompanying notes 17-21 and 105-17 supra.
219. See text accompanying note 30 supra.
220. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
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debt and avoid the onus of bankruptcy, 221 cram down has been so

strictly defined under the new act that the versatility it once offered
debtors 222 has all but been eliminated under the guise of providing protection for dissenting creditors and interest holders. The original tenor
of the cram down provision was lost when Congress designated one
confirmation standard for classes assenting to the reorganization, 2 23 but
framed a stricter standard to be applied only to classes dissenting to the
224
plan.
Classes assenting to the plan are entitled to receive compensation according to the "best interests" test. 225 This test as it was used
under chapter XI of the old act was defined as giving creditors more
than they would receive in liquidation. 226 Dissenting classes on the
other hand, are entitled to "fair and equitable" treatment, 227 and
classes of secured creditors dissenting to the plan must receive the indubitable equivalence of their claims. The result of this dichotomy is that
cram down under the new act offers more to dissenting classes than to
assenting ones. Therefore, it encourages classes to dissent, since
they will be awarded full compensation for dissenting while they would
have to be content with liquidation value 228 should they agree to the
plan. Instead of providing a means by which the debtor can effectuate
a reasonable plan despite the recalcitrance of creditors, Congress, by
encouraging classes to dissent, has made it more difficult for the debtor
to meet the stricter compensation demands necessary to realize a successful reorganization.
A better solution would be to require that dissenters receive no less
than what they would receive had they assented to the plan. Com221.

See H.R. REP No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 225-27, reprintedin [19781 U.S. CODE

CONG. & AD. NEWS 6184-87.

222. Cram down was initially intended to increase the debtor's ability to achieve conformation
despite the truculence of one or several creditors. See In re KRO Assocs., 4 Bankr Ct. Dec. 432
(S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., 10 C.B.C. 581 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
223. See Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2635-37 (1978) (to be codified at IIU.S.C. § 1129(a)).
224. See id., 92 Stat. 2637-38 (1978) (to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
225. The specific wording of the new act calls for the holder of a claim to receive "not less than
the amount that such holder would. . . receive if the debtor were liquidated." Pub. L. No. 95598, 92 Stat. 2635-37 (1978) (to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a) (7) (A) (ii)). The best interest
standard as it was used in the context of chapters XI and XII requires the claimant to receive more
than the liquidation value of the claim. While the new act does not use the same language of
chapters XI and XII, it seems likely that courts will continue to apply the same standard, namely,
more than liquidation value.
226. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 251-55, reprintedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6210-13.
227. See text accompanying notes 171-74 supra. See also Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637-38
(1978) (to be codified at I1 U.S.C. § 1129(b)).
228. See note 225 supra. But see King, supra note 202, at 130.
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monly, the most senior class of creditors dissents to the plan. Under a
provision which entitled dissenting classes to the same standard of
value as assenting ones, a senior class would still receive more of their
claims than would other classes of creditors simply by virtue of the fact
that, if they hold secured claims, the value of the collateral probably
would have more general value than other assets of the debtor and
therefore would yield a greater liquidation value. A requirement that
dissenters receive liquidation value or better, 229 rather than complete
compensation, actually could protect creditors generally, in that such a
requirement would prevent debtors from taking advantage of dissenters
by forcing them to accept less than the value to which they are entitled.
The flexibility that Congress intended to pervade the entire reorganization scheme is drastically limited by the inclusion of the absolute
priority rule. 230 The absolute priority rule restricts the debtor's maneu-

verability while providing protection for creditors which Congress previously concluded to be unnecessary. 23' Although the absolute priority
rule was included as the confirmation standard in chapter X23 2 in order
233 it
to prevent abuse of public interest holders by corporate insiders,
has been noted that as a result of changes in corporate composition, the
rule now often works to exclude rather than protect the public in a
reorganization proceeding. 234 Furthermore, prior case history demonstrates the difficulties facing a debtor desirous of implementing cram
down when beset by the restrictions imposed by the absolute priority
rule. 235 The foregoing considerations cast doubt on Congress' wisdom
in incorporating this rule in the new act. Instead, Congress would have
been wiser to exclude the absolute priority rule from the cram down
provision.
The new cram down provision has partially resolved the HerwegPine Gate dispute as to whether cram down is available despite the
unanimous objection of all secured creditors to the plan. The new provision states that at least one class of claims must accept the plan before
229. See Bankruptcy Act § 366(2), i U.S.C. § 766(a) (1976). See, e.g., United Properties v.
Emporium Dept. Stores, 379 F.2d 55 (8th Cir. 1967).
230. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637-38 (1978)(to be codified at II U.S.C. § 1129(b)). See

also text accompanying notes 206-09 supra.
231. See H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222-24 reprinted in [1978] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS 6181-84.

232. Bankruptcy Act. § 221, II U.S.C. § 621 (1976).
233. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 222-24, reprintedin11978] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEWS 6181-84.
234. Id.
235. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. American Trailer Rentals Co., 379 U.S. 594 (1965); General Stores
Corp. v. Shlensky, 350 U.S. 462 (1956); Consolidated Rock Prods. Co. v. Du Bois, 312 U.S. 510
(1941); Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Co., 308 U.S. 106 (1939).
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the other classes can be subject to cram down. 236 The new act defines
claims as those debts held by secured or unsecured creditors, so that
acceptance by either class of creditor will satisfy the condition. However, acceptance by a single class of equity interest holders will not.
This condition could lead to flagrant abuse by both debtors and
creditors. 237 A debtor, for example, might incur an unsecured obligation shortly before filing a Chapter 11 petition. The debtor would have
created an unsecured class of claims comfortable with the knowledge
that the absolute priority rule would subordinate the unsecured creditor's claim to those of more senior secured class. The result would be
that the unsecured creditor would be likely to accept the plan, since it
would stand a better chance of being paid if it did. In this way, the
debtor would be assured the vote of an assenting class as protection
against being forced into liquidation proceedings.
The requirement also could be abused by a sole secured creditor.
By requiring the acquiescence of one class of claims, the new act fails to
consider the problem this condition would cause the debtor whose only
creditor is unalterably and perhaps unreasonably opposed to the plan.
Since the new act does not provide any exceptions, it appears that in
such a situation, the court may have no choice but to dismiss the petition, unless the courts themselves decide to carve out an exception.
Should such a situation occur, it is submitted that the courts should still
follow the rationale of Pine Gate-ie., that a sole secured creditor
should not be permitted to frustrate needlessly the entire rehabilitative
238
proceeding.
While it is essential that creditors and interest holders affected by a
reorganization receive compensation for their claims and interests, the
courts have allowed much latitude in the modification and alteration of
these rights, even without the consent of the claimants. Congress might
easily have accepted these limitations and still have provided the
debtor with sufficient manueverability to implement a plan of arrangement that adequately protected creditors and which could be confirmed, despite creditor dissent, via cram down. Through the insertion
of several devices calculated to protect dissenting creditors, Congress
has altered cram down from a mechanism to support debtors into a
process replete with obstacles and diversions which have effectively
transformed the procedure into a shield for creditors.
236. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2637 (1978)(to be codified at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10)).
237. This could be for any sort of unsecured debt, varying in form from the trivial to the
significant.
238. See text accompanying notes 108-13 supra.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

Congress could have maintained the versatility of cram down, and
even improved upon it if it had provided dissenting classes with the
same fair treatment accorded assenting classes. A double standard of
treatment obscures the ultimate goal of providing claimants with a flexible means to secure adequate compensation. Instead of the fair and
equitable confirmation standard for dissenting classes and the best interests test for assenting ones, Congress should have adopted best interests as the standard universally applicable to all classes. In that way,
assenting classes would not be penalized for accepting the plan, nor
would dissenting classes be rewarded for their negative votes. Creditors and equity-interest holders would still receive payment or protection for the value of their debts or interests based upon the nature of
their claims without setting superfluous obstacles in the debtor's path to
successful rehabilitation.
CONCLUSION

In efforts to enhance the flexibility of a reorganization proceeding,
Congress has incorporated an alternative confirmation standard,
known as cram down into chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978. Essential to understanding the mechanics of cram down under
the new act is a firm grasp of the precedent affecting cram down in
chapter XII of the old act. The ambiguities present in the chapter XII
provision prompted two divergent theories for determining the availability of cram down. On one hand, the traditional one-step approach
restricted cram down to situations where at least one class of secured
creditors had already assented to the plan. This approach was particularly harsh when the debtor's plan affected only a sole secured creditor.
The effect was to give the sole secured creditor complete veto power
over the success or failure of the debtor's plan. The two-step approach
challenges the traditional rule on the basis of congressional intent, statutory interpretation and modem business conditions. This approach
held that the adequacy of protection, not number of dissenting secured
creditors was the intended focal point of the cram down provision.
The new cram down provision attempted to resolve this dispute as
well as to expand the accessibility of cram down to debtors whose plans
affect creditors and interest holders. However, the new provision
overcompensated for the ambiguities present in the old chapter. The
requirements necessary for cram down are so strictly defined that the
versatility offered the chapter XII debtor using the two-step approach
has been virtually eliminated in efforts to provide protection for dis-
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senting creditors and interest holders. The adoption of a stricter standard of confirmation for dissenting classes than for assenting ones,
entitling dissenters to greater compensation, has the effect of encouraging creditors to dissent. The incorporation of the absolute priority rule serves no substantive function other than to hamper the
debtor's arrangement of a successful plan. The election provision
deprives the debtor of the opportunity to postpone payment of debts,
but gives creditors the right to demand immediate cash payment.
The codification of the requirement that at least one class of creditors
assent prior to invoking cram down eliminates one area of dispute but
opens up possibilities for abuse. Furthermore, the new provision fails
to solve the problem of the debtor whose only creditor stubbornly refuses to agree to the plan.
In sum, these requirements reduce the debtor's flexibility while
providing a corresponding increase in devices calculated to protect
creditor's rights. Congress might have prevented this result if it had
adopted a clear statement of the rule which requires courts first to acknowledge the number of dissenting creditors, then to determine
whether the plan provides these creditors with the same fair treatment
afforded the assenting classes. The new cram down provision contains
too many protective devices for creditors and too few for debtors.
ANNE WEBBER EPSTEIN

